Navy must reorient its resourcing priorities to recapitalize its sea control capabilities by turning its attention "back to the sea." The Navy must develop a comprehensive strategy to meet the challenges of 21st Century sea control. The Navy's value to the Nation will be measured against its ability to exercise sea control to support the attainment of national strategic objectives. This SRP examines the Navy sea control capabilities required to support new U.S. strategic priorities. It concludes that the Navy must "rebalance" the priority assigned to the core mission of sea control and recommends the crafting of a new maritime strategy that adequately considers the realities of the new strategic environment and addresses resourcing priorities. At the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Navy assessed the strategic environment and altered its focus and capabilities to meet the challenges of a perceived "new world order."
2 As the Soviet Union dissolved, the sole challenge to U.S. control of the seas faded. So too did the U.S. Navy's focus on sea control capabilities. The 1992 joint Navy and Marine Corps white paper "…From the Sea" re-defined the U.S. Navy's vision and purpose in the post Cold War era. 3 Clearly, as that generation of leaders saw it, the requirement for sea control to assure delivery of ten divisions in ten days to Europe was no longer valid -the U.S. Navy needed a new raison d'être. The Navy's "new reason for being" was its ability to project power from the sea. "Forward From the Sea" formalized this thinking and set a new course away from sea control and toward power projection. 4 Since the end of the Cold War, circumstances have both helped to set and then reinforce this new course. The successful employment of Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs) and carrier air power during Operation Desert Storm was both a leading indicator of and an impetus for a power projection-centric strategy. The decade since 9/11, with campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, has reinforced the perceived correctness of Navy's decision to assign power projection ashore a higher priority than sea control. The current maritime strategy written in 2007, "A Cooperative Strategy for 21 st Century Sea power," affirms power projection's pre-eminent status: "Power Projection. Our ability to overcome challenges to access and to project and sustain power ashore is the basis of our combat credibility." 5 Perhaps the decisions made over the past twenty years were appropriate for their time. But, the strategic environment
has changed yet again.
In 2011, President Obama declared that the United States has arrived at a moment of transition. U.S. strategy going forward will place a higher priority on the AsiaPacific region. 6 To be sure, other regions and strategic challenges, particularly in the Greater Middle East, will necessitate U.S. power and presence. But, the "signal is in the air": U.S. strategy and defense resourcing will be increasingly optimized towards the Asia-Pacific region. Accordingly, the U.S. Navy must re-assess the strategic environment, craft an appropriate maritime strategy and then allocate resources to support this new strategic priority. If the last twenty years has been about what our Navy has done "from the sea," the next twenty -and possibly longer -will be about how the U.S. Navy sets and navigates a new strategic course "back to the sea."
A Changed Strategic Environment
The strategic environment has changed significantly since 1992. Words like volatile, uncertain, complex, chaotic, and ambiguous appear frequently in discourse on security, economics, and global politics. Western European powers continue to reduce their investments in defense as the cost of social programs and debt consume an ever increasing share of resources. 7 The European Union is fighting for its fiscal futureand perhaps even its political existence. The "re-set button" for the U.S.-Russia relationship seems to be broken. Consequently, U.S. policy and strategy must still account for Russia because many of its Soviet era capabilities remain, the most significant of which are her strategic forces. Russia's latent economic power provides sufficient resources to re-capitalize its military -including its Navy -with the revenue acquired from export of its vast energy resources. Although Russia's demographics argue against a sustained resurgence, it maintains the military capacity to do more harm to the United States than any other country.
In contrast to the ebbing power of European nations, Asian power is surging.
The rise of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) continues unabated -seemingly immune to the financial and economic problems plaguing the West. China's increased economic might has elevated it to global power status. This status is more prominently manifested in its modernized and increasingly active military. China's increased economic and military might, combined with its maritime claims and recent actions in the South China Sea, have raised concerns about how a resurgent China will use its power. India too is rising. Its economic and military power has grown and can be expected to continue. Japan seems to be inching closer to making the transition to a more conventional approach to military affairs as her neighbors present greater challenges. But, Japan also faces an aging and shrinking population and has yet to emerge from two decades of relative economic stagnation. In the Middle East, the challenge posed by Iran is taking center stage. Iran appears to have used the windfall of higher energy prices to invest in military capabilities to counter U.S. military advantages and is assessed by some observers to be pursuing nuclear weapons under the guise of a peaceful nuclear energy program. Additionally, in the Middle East and North Africa, the "Arab Spring" has brought down four governments and threatens a fifth while a multiplicity of forces remain in play for the allegiance of the region's people. It remains to be seen whether the future security environment will be more or less threatening.
Amongst all this complexity of the changing strategic environment, there exists one dominant feature -the rise of China. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the National Security Adviser in the Carter Administration, has stated that for the United States, "the central challenge over the next several decades will be to revitalize itself while promoting a larger West and accommodating China's rising global status." 8 The unipolar world that emerged at the end of the Cold War is evolving into something different -but, as yet undefined. Generally, there is a "rise of the rest" within the context of a perceived decline in U.S. power and an increasing tendency towards multi-polarity. 9 On the one hand, emerging powers create potential emerging markets that could "refuel" U.S. "economic engine." On the other hand, as emerging powers develop military power commensurate with their interests and aspirations, economic issues yield to strategic concerns.
Because of an increased diffusion of power and the unpredictability of the alchemy of fear, honor and interests, any transition from a uni-polar world to some other international order will bring with it greater uncertainty regarding the stability and durability of a peaceful international order. Within the context of this changing strategic environment, the United States has shifted its strategic priorities to the Asia-Pacific region. Now, DoD, and in particular the Navy, must craft a new, comprehensive strategy to address what is an increasingly challenging and changing operational and tactical environment in a time of fiscal austerity.
The Changing Operational & Tactical Environments
In practice we always base our preparations against an enemy on the assumption that his plans are good; indeed, it is right to rest our hopes not on our belief in his blunders, but on the soundness of our provisions. Navy's force composition, because of our global interests, is designed to be expeditionary and self-sustainable. Extended lines of communication and operations require vessels to operate for prolonged periods at sea with sufficient fuel and stores to conduct global operations. Consequently, the U.S. Navy possesses relatively large surface combatants, nuclear aircraft carriers, amphibious ships, and submarines.
Nuclear power gives our submarines and aircraft carriers unmatched endurance and flexibility. Super carriers remain the centerpiece of U.S. naval power. Escorted by highly capable surface combatants, our Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs) and Amphibious
Ready Groups (ARGs) provide potent, flexible, responsive power projection capability across the globe. But, this power can be brought to bear only if we control the seas.
So, the rising challenge to our ability to control the seas is the central problem facing the U.S. Navy. The ability to use U.S. naval power to achieve a political objective rests on the ability to control the seas. While we have been busy projecting power from the sea in the skies above Iraq and Afghanistan for the last decade, the global strategic, operational, and tactical environments have undergone radical change. We now face the threat posed by potential adversaries' anti-access and area denial capabilities.
Rise of Anti-Access and Area Denial Threats
The Arguably, as technology moves ahead and emerging powers develop military capability, they will pursue capabilities to deny U.S. global reach and access by challenging our ability to project power from the sea. To do this, they will deprive us of what we most need to get to and support operations -control of the seas. The recent establishment of the Air Sea Battle (ASB) Joint Program Office demonstrates both the seriousness of the problem and the extent to which Navy leaders are committed to working toward joint solutions. As DoD sees the problem,
The ASB concept is a natural and deliberate evolution of U.S. warfighting to counter emerging A2/AD threats that include conventional ballistic missiles, long-range precision cruise missiles, advanced integrated air and missile defense systems, electronic and cyber warfare capabilities, submarines, surface combatants, and modern combat aircraft. Air-Sea Battle will enable the projection of force in defense of U.S. interests and those of our allies and by sustaining stability and freedom of access throughout the global commons. 13 (Emphasis added)
The ability to project power endures, but assured access enabled by control of the seas is a prerequisite for assuring freedom of maneuver, logistics support, and flexibility to achieve national objectives. The risk of not being able to control the seas has risen Without these systems, these ships' sea control capability is handicapped.
Sea control ordnance for both ships and aircraft has similarly been divested. The
Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missile (TASM) was phased out of the fleet in the early 1990s. Additionally, because of manpower limitations, carrier air power lacks the flexibility and persistence needed to prevail in the current tactical environment.
Taken as a whole, the decisions taken over the last twenty years resulting in the divestiture of critical sea control capabilities have weakened the U.S. Navy's ability to control the seas. To be sure, a number of programs and initiatives show promise. The improved anti-submarine warfare suite (SQQ-89 AV15) being fitted on DDGs 79 and higher, the Mark 54 torpedo, and efforts to develop a new ASCM are encouraging. But, the pace at which these systems are being fielded appears only to slow a decline when a surge ahead is required. In addition to the divestment of sea control capabilities, the U.S. Navy's sea control skills have atrophied.
Many factors have resulted in the atrophy of vital sea control skill sets. The removal of ships and weapon systems from the inventory without replacement is one.
An axiom of naval warfare asserts that, "to know tactics, know technology. ability to control the seas. These threatening capabilities must be adequately accounted for in a new maritime strategy.
In the current fiscal environment, the acute competition for resources between and within services presents significant challenges as strategic leaders seek to formulate force sizing and employment concepts that will require reallocation of scarce resources. The U.S. Navy's successful support of the current fights in Iraq and
Afghanistan over the past decade enhances the appeal of a "steady as she goes" approach. However, the shift in U.S. strategic priority to the Pacific and the enduring challenge from Iran demands an adequately resourced strategy, not a resource-driven strategy.
The Current Maritime Strategy Congress and the public of the Navy's continuing relevance to national security as the nation was engaged in two substantial land campaigns. The second perspective was international. This strategy was intended to communicate the U.S. Navy's commitment to multilateral and coalition operations. The document may reflect both of these perspectives, but it is not a true strategy because it does not describe the maritime environment -to include evolving threats within the operational and tactical environments -no does it provide sufficient detail about the ways in which naval power will be brought to bear and the means required to achieve national objectives. The current recruiting slogan, "A Global Force for Good," is a parallel re-branding effort reflecting a "feel-good" perspective on an altruistic cooperative strategy. 19 Given the strategic environment in 2007, the aims of this strategy may have been appropriate.
However, it is apparent that the strategic environment has changed. The nation must craft a new maritime strategy.
A New Maritime Strategy
A new maritime strategy needs to reorient Navy priorities on fighting and winning in high intensity multi-threat sea combat. With this in mind, a new maritime strategy should address six key issues. First, it needs to provide a detailed description, analysis and assessment of the strategic, operational and tactical environments out to 2025.
Second, the strategy must identify the national ends that our maritime instrument of power will be used to achieve. Third, it must prioritize the ends that the Navy will support. These priorities must place sea control as a pre-requisite for projecting power ashore. Fourth, the strategy must specify potential threats. If a classified version is needed to avert unwanted political consequences, then classify that part of the strategy.
Fifth, the strategy should describe the ways in which U.S. naval power will be used to carry out the key tasks in support of the priority objectives. Finally, it must describe the necessary means -size and composition of the fleet -required to achieve the strategic ends.
Naval Capabilities
The development of naval capabilities has long been recognized as a complex encouraging. But, the U.S. Navy is years away from a fielded system; in the meantime potential adversaries are raising the stakes in this area. There is no more urgent requirement than deploying a persistent, long-range ASCM with the fleet to provide Joint Force Commanders with the reach and persistence to deter an adversary by holding its forces at risk or to defeat the enemy should deterrence fail.
Next, we must move forward with advanced electronic warfare systems that provide both the awareness of an adversary's attempts to detect, localize, and engage our ships and aircraft as well as the ability to disrupt enemy surveillance, localization, will be difficult. But, given the significant changes in the fiscal and strategic environments, the window of opportunity to ensure we have taken a final "fix before heading into the channel" is rapidly closing.
Regarding modernization, important upgrades to surface combatants are programmed. But as fiscal constraints increase, the pressure to decommission additional ships and slow modernization will increase. Installation of up-graded passive anti-submarine warfare and ASCMs on Flight II DDG-51 Guided Missile Destroyers is urgently needed. These modernizations will provide operational commanders with persistent surveillance and credible sea control capabilities. These modernization programs should be protected and accelerated.
The ways that Navy leaders define and consider attributes for the material solutions to improve sea control capabilities are critical. During the determination of requirements, persistence and responsiveness must be considered. Often when describing capability, Navy planners assign value to the range that a pairing of platform and weapon provides. Over the past two decades, appropriate value has not been placed on the attributes of persistence and responsiveness. Reach is important, but, if the performance objective of additional range is achieved at the expense of responsiveness and persistence, Navy planners must be sure that those decisions are validated through honest, substantive and rigorous analysis. This is particularly relevant with regard to the problem of transitioning from Phase I to Phase II Operations. In the ambiguous minutes -or months -between deterrence operations and commencing hostilities, the force with the more persistent and responsive capabilities will be able to apply effective precision firepower first -the tactical objective in naval combat. 22 If the capability we rely upon today, or develop for the future, cannot be employed without tactically important delays, then perhaps we need to rethink the design of the force. Navy must make a concerted effort to focus on the revision, promulgation and exercise of sea control doctrine for fleet and strike group operations, particularly for the increasingly complex and varied data links and command and control systems being fielded while reaching out to the Air Force and Army to involve them appropriately.
Fleet Centers of Excellence and Operational Organization:
The Navy's most glaring organizational issue that should be addressed is a re-organization of the centers of excellence to broaden their roles and missions to cross platform types. Naval Mine and Anti-submarine Warfare Command (NMAWC) already does this. But NSAWC has too much to offer to serve only the aviation community. NSWC, or some entity, should pick up the pieces from the disestablishment of the Surface Warfare Development
Group to drive a renaissance in sea control. It is only slightly tongue-in-cheek to say that perhaps the Navy will soon open an Air-Sea Battle office to figure out how to coordinate the efforts of the Navy's warfare communities to foster greater integration and innovation among the surface, aviation, and submarine communities. There are also organizational challenges in the Navy's fleet operational structure.
The current composition of deployed Carrier Strike Groups is inadequate. A smaller fleet is one factor bearing on this problem. Another is the increased number of missions for the surface combatant fleet, which has fewer ships than it had ten years ago. For example, the requirement for ballistic missile defense is driving down the number of surface combatant escorts assigned to strike groups. Consequently, strike groups deploy with fewer assets for sea control. Also the Navy has been increasingly disaggregating deployed strike groups to provide platforms to Navy and Joint Force operational commanders to accomplish a longer list of presence requirements. Without substantive analysis of the risk imposed by a reduced number of surface combatant escorts, organic to the CSG, some of these presence requirements might be better described as "desire-ments." Succinctly stated, "desire-ments" are transformed into requirements through a process of bureaucratic metaphysics that assigns a higher priority to various partnership and presence tasks than the operational requirement to provide necessary defense-in-depth of an aircraft carrier -a national strategic asset.
Over the course of the past two decades, the U.S. Navy has become too comfortable in "assuming away" risk to the force -primarily to the aircraft carriers, but also to the naval force in general. The assumptions underpinning Navy risk assessments, though based on rational and historical analysis, have become overly influenced by "wishful thinking"
that often downplays the threat posed by potential adversaries. These assessments have been overly weighted towards perceptions of intentions with inadequate weight given to capabilities. Fewer ships and increased missions have resulted in CSG compositions that appear robust on paper but, are actually deployed with few surface combatant escorts. Upon deployment, escorts are thinned out even further, or disaggregated, to fulfill missions in deployed areas of responsibility (AORs) rather than provide persistent defense-in-depth and sea control in support of High Value Units.
Operational commanders regard the opportunities for presence as outweighing the risk posed by potential adversaries. As a result of the mission demands on a decreasing number of surface combatants the Navy has stepped back from the concept of expeditionary strike groups in which surface combatant escorts provided defense-indepth to bid deck Amphibious Assault Ships. The abandonment of this concept was tacit acknowledgment that with dwindling resources amphibious forces must operate without robust defensive capability.
Has the time come for Navy leaders to rethink these decisions? Are decisions to reduce carrier strike group escort numbers and to operate carriers with fewer escorts based on facts, or outdated assumptions -or "wishful thinking?" "Are our assumptions valid?" is a critical question that must be asked and honestly and substantively answered. Or, are we simply shaving just a bit more off of defense-in-depth during each budget crunch or request for forces? Does the habit of operating carriers with only one escort weaken our Navy institutionally by desensitizing the fleet to the challenges of the rapidly evolving operational environment?
Cultural Barriers: One of the greatest challenges the Navy faces in returning its focus "back to the sea" one of culture. Four aspects of modern Navy culture appear to be significant barriers to addressing the challenges of 21 st Century sea control. The first is the Navy's warfare community barriers. Too few of our officers have had the opportunity to work alongside their peers in other communities to share their personal views of the naval profession. It takes many hours over many days and weeks for professionals to arrive at a shared understanding and mutual concern about their profession. We have too few shared experiences to establish strong cultural bonds.
The second are structural barriers. Senior Navy leaders should confront the inequity between communities as a "chose your rate, choose your fate" issue.
Enormous pay differences break down cohesion; they are corrosive. Retention bonuses are necessary. But, can we afford the financial cost and disregard the corrosive effect when bonuses and special pays continue for those no longer performing those duties and with only lateral career options in their future. When does retention pay become an entitlement? At some point, inequality becomes a problem for the institution.
The third is the tension both between effectiveness and efficiency and between war fighting and the "enterprise" mentality. We should not "throw the baby out with the bath-water" when it comes to how we think through and apply resources to achieve performance objectives. Establishing metrics and driving organizational change and improvement through their use can strengthen the organization. However, overemphasis on these metrics has resulted in two traps. First, standards have become muddled. Frequently, in the drive to make things more intuitive, figures turn into colors and middle-of-the-road assessments proliferate. Then there is the problem of insatiability. More and more metrics are established, but no one accounts for the resulting increase in workload. Soon the young petty officers and division officers are consumed with data entry and review. While they are focused on "count beans," they fail to interact with their people and learn their warfighting stock and trade. This phenomena has an insidious effect on war fighting competency.
Finally, the fourth aspect of modern Navy culture that poses a barrier to addressing the challenges of 21 st Century sea control requirements is the institutionalization of the euphemisms of "enterprise speak" -euphemistic perspectives risk eroding the war fighting core of our profession. The impact of "enterprise speak" is evident when officers consider a particular tactical problem resident in a war plan and note that the enterprise has assessed the likelihood of that contingency occurring as being low. So, the enterprise solution is not to dedicate resources to address the tactical problem. The essential problem with "enterprise speak" is that it is euphemistic.
When language based on euphemism drives thinking -and language shapes understanding -it calls into question the value the institution places candor, plain talk, personal responsibility and command judgment.
Conclusion
Sea control endures as the keystone of our national security. Without it, we lose our ability to respond flexibly to a crisis at the time and place of our choosing. If we cannot protect the sea lines of communication, there is not enough airlift in the world to enable land and air power to project power ashore, to act decisively, and to coerce an enemy to do our will. In the two decades since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Navy has placed much greater emphasis on power projection than on sea control. The time has come to return sea control to its rightful preeminent place within our Navy. The U.S. Navy must craft a new maritime strategy that reflects the new, evolving national strategy that focuses on the Asia-Pacific region as our future priority while sustaining the Navy's ability to address persistent challenges in the Middle East persist. The operational and tactical environments have changed dramatically over the last two decades. Increasing and more capable forms of anti-access and area denial capabilities are being developed and deployed by potential adversaries. To defeat these rising challenges to national security, a renewed strategic resourcing commitment to sea control is urgently needed. New material solutions are needed to give our Sailors the best available tools of war. Changes to doctrine, organization and training are required to develop the Navy's capabilities to meet the operational and tactical challenges of the present and future operational and tactical environments. The cultural barriers between our surface, aviation and submarine communities must be addressed if we are to achieve the unity of effort needed to swiftly set this new course and navigate our Navy "back to the sea." Endnotes
